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Introduction
The Internet has revolutionized communication, enabling academic institutions, research institutes, private companies, government agencies and individuals to have worldwide public access to interconnected computer networks that transmit data using the standard Internet Protocol (IP). This communication phenomenon has rendered instant access to an exponentially growing amount of information, facilitating what has fast become a global economy. No longer exclusively limited to the transmission of rudimentary data, there is an increasing demand to facilitate more sophisticated real-time communication forms such as voice and video. Along with the inherent benefits and advancements of such a revolutionary communication network, attention has focused on the ever-growing need for information security in the both the private and public sectors. It is with regard to this critical need that the basic Internet Protocol has been found lacking; it lacks an inherent ability to provide an all-inclusive, end-to-end security solution in the network layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) basic reference model.
Due to the inherent nature of the Internet, where streams of data merge and flow through different routers and links before reaching their final destination, it becomes imperative to use cryptography? the study and practice of technologically hiding information? as the means for obtaining security and privacy. This security attempt has commonly been implemented in the application layer of the OSI model. However, if properly implemented in the application layer, every encryption becomes applicationspecific and, as a result, a very heavy burden is placed on the system administrator. In addition, many encryption schemes can fall prey to man-in-the-middle attacks or to the requirement that symmetric keys be exchanged over insecure channels. To avoid these problems, digital certificates and public-key cryptography have been extensively utilized, but public key cryptography is very slow even with modern processors.
Thus, in an attempt to provide an end-to-end security solution governed by the network layer, the IP Security (IPSec) suite was implemented. IPSec seamlessly merges several protocols and integrates with both IPv4 and IPv6 to provide source authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and replay-attack protection (and can also be used to construct Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), thus connecting distinct networks into a single larger one) without the inherent limitations of utilizing the application layer of the OSI model. In addition, ICMP, TCP and UDP protocols all work with IPSec.
IPSec
IPSec is the combination of many different protocols into a comprehensive architecture. Currently, IPSec comprises the following protocols: AH (Authentication Header), ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload), IKE (Internet Key Exchange), ISAKMP/Oakley (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol), and associated transforms. However, from a practical application standpoint, IPSec is normally applied to IP packets in the form of Authentication Headers or Encapsulating Security Payloads. We briefly describe the protocols used in IPSec.
AH: Authentication Headers
AH?as the name implies? is used to authenticate IP packets. Thus it only guarantees that the received packet was not modified while in transit, that it was not sent by a third party (packet spoofing), and, if implemented, that it is a new, non-replayed packet. As such, AH does not provide any encryption capabilities and thus no confidentiality. AH does not mandate the underlying authenticating algorithm that must be used, but rather relies upon two other protocols, ISAKMP and IKE, to determine the appropriate algorithm. Two underlying authentication algorithms that all users must support are HMAC-SHA-96 (which is an acronym for Hashed Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm-96) and HMAC-MD5-96 (Hashed Message Authentication Code-Message Digest 5-96). Due to the processing power consumption and slowness of public key authentication methods, RSA and Digital Signature Standard (DSS) are currently not implemented in or defined for use with AH.
AH can be implemented in transport mode or tunnel mode. When implemented with transport mode, the AH header immediately follows the IP header but comes before upper-layer protocol headers.
This implementation provides basic, end-to-end communication protection. When implemented with tunnel mode, the AH encapsulates the protected packet datagram. Thus the original packet maintains the same IP addressing while an additional IP header is added before the AH header for tunnel addressing. The following provides an example of an original IP datagram, an AH transport datagram, and an AH tunnel datagram: When AH is implemented, an outbound Security Association (SA) is created either by IKE or by manual configuration. To provide the ability to prevent replay attacks, a sequence number counter is initialized to zero. Prior to the construction of each AH header, the SA is incremented, thus ensuring an increasing, unique, nonzero, The authenticating of immutable fields in an attempt to provide authenticity for the packet necessitates that the source IP address and destination IP address be included in the ICV. However, this provides a unique problem concerning Network Address Translation (NAT) ? a network setup commonly seen. Because NAT forwards packets from a gateway to host computers, and thus requires the changing of the destination IP address, the authentication capability of AH collapses in an end-to-end AH transport mode setup involving NAT.
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ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload
Encapsulating Security Payload, however, provides both authentication as well as confidentiality. As was the case with AH, anti-replay services are provided, though not mandated.
As the ESP header is an IPSec header, it contains an SPI field which is an arbitrary number selected during an IKE exchange. This SPI value is not encrypted, but rather is only authenticated and is used to identify the encryption algorithm and key needed to decrypt the packet. All actual data that is encrypted, or protected by ESP, is held within the payload data field. Due to the nature of block cipher encryptions, padding is used in ESP to maintain boundaries, thus providing flexibility for different encryption schemes. If ESP is being implemented in transport mode, then the ESP header will be placed between the upper-level and the IP headers. In other words, when using IPv4 in transport mode, the ESP header will be placed immediately after the IP header. However, if using IPv6 in transport mode, the ESP header is placed after the extension headers. For tunnel mode, on the other hand, the ESP header is •prepended• to the IP packet ? the IP header contains the source address of the device applying the ESP and the destination address is obtained from the SA. The following provides an example of an original IP datagram, an ESP transport datagram, and an ESP tunnel datagram: Although the ISAKMP protocol defines and provides a means of authentication, information for key exchanges, and the negotiation of security services, it does not define either how particular keys are exchanged or the necessary security associations. ISAKMP denotes two exchange phases. The first exchange phase establishes an SA (this is not the same as an IPSec SA) for the communication. This relays information on how the peers will authenticate each other to provide protection to phase two. The second phase establishes SAs for other protocols. Once phase two ends, the ISAKMP process is destroyed.
The first step of any ISAKMP exchange is the generation and exchanging of cookies. These cookies are 8 bit pseudo-random numbers generated by each entity. Each cookie is unique and is normally constructed using the Photuris key exchange: a hash of the entity•s IP address, port, protocol and some timestamp and is referred to as the Initiator Cookie (IC) and the Responder Cookie (RC). This key exchange is done prior to any intensive operations (i.e. Diffie-Hellman exponentiation). This allows for the dropping of bogus ISAKMP messages that a denial-of-service attacker would use.
When establishing a shared SA, a flexible parsing of SA, proposal, and transform payloads must be allowed. In order to identify the communications and respective SA, a Message ID (MID) is given to the communication after the initial response. In addition, after both cookies are transmitted, they are concatenated to form the Security Parameters 
IKE: Internet Key Exchange
As ISAKMP does not conduct an actual key exchange, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol augments the IPSec suite thus allowing for an authenticated key and agreed-upon security services between two hosts. Like ISAKMP, IKE is a two-phase exchange: the first phase establishing the IKE SA and the second phase using the SA to negotiate further security associations for IPSec. One unique aspect of IKE, however, is that it is not limited to IPSec alone, but is rather a generic protocol that can be used in routing protocols (RIP and OSPF).
IKE denotes two types of phase one exchanges, one type of phase two exchange, and two other exchanges. All of the security parameters used by IKE are referred to as a •protection suite• ? encryption and hash algorithm, authentication method, and Diffie-Hellman group. These protection suites are negotiated between hosts by exchanging ISAKMP SA payloads ? all contained in transform payloads. Most hash algorithms use the HMAC form in the form of a pseudo-random function (PRF). For more information about the Diffie-Hellman, see Appendix A.
Central to the parameters established for the Diffie-Hellman exchange is the Diffie-Hellman group being used as it determines the key created and exchanged. These are predefined groups, of which there are currently five:
Algorithmically, it is considered that groups 1 and 3 and groups 2 and 4 provide similar levels of security. However, there is no elliptic curve analog to the modulus prime group 5. After the Diffie-Hellman group is determined, the authentication utilizes one of four primary means for authentication for IPSec: preshared keys, exchanging encrypted nonces, digital signatures using the Digital Signature Algorithm, and the Rivest-ShamirAdelman (RSA) algorithm. For more information about the implementation of these algorithms, see Appendix B.
Research Study
A primary purpose of this study was to test the full scale implementation of IPSec•s Authentication Headers and Encapsulating Security Payloads. Since we wished to test the implications of IPSec upon NAT, the use of a router was imperative. In addition, the primary OS chosen was Windows XP due to the wide commercial availability and support, in addition to the reliance of the Department of Defense upon the Windows XP OS. As a Linux variant, we tested SUSE 10.3 from Novell.
Initial Setup and Configuration
Because we wanted to provide the ability to test three possible variations of IPSec implementation? Ipv4 only, IPv6-only, and IPv4-IPv6? we set up each of the four computers as a VLAN on our Cisco 3845 router. On each computer we installed VMware running, in addition to the host operating system, Windows XP SP2 and SUSE 10.3. Initially, all computers were setup as IPv4 only. Thus our network was designed as the following diagram depicts: After setting up the IP addresses, we conducted basic pinging and file transfer using ftp to ensure that the network was properly configured.
IPSec Policy Configuration
We started by configuring the Windows boxes to use IPSec ESPs for all traffic. By accessing the secpol.msc console, we were able to select and add rules to require security for all traffic, both incoming and outgoing. Windows XP offers three options when configuring for IPSec: Kerberos, Certificates, and Pre-shared Key. Due to the nature of our setup, we used the pre-shared key •usna• on all of the Windows machines. The encryption algorithms allowed were DES, 3DES, and AES. In an effort to lessen the complexity of the encryption in the hopes of mathematically proving how IPSec was being implemented, we utilized DES as our primary, or first transform. We selected MD5 for the HMAC-hash. We also selected the •Low• 768 bit Diffie -Hellman group, without perfect forward secrecy.
By setting the policy to •require• authentication, every protocol including ICMP was affected, thus resulting in pinging problems between the Windows and Linux boxes. Of note is that the authentication headers are not affected by internal NAT schemes between VLANs. The only situation where the problem was made manifest was in the translation between external and internal 1:1 NAT schemes.
IPSec File Transfer and Packet Sniffing Analysis
In order to see the ISAKMP and IKE protocols being implemented, we setup a test FTP Server using XLight FTP Server on White-Queen. We then created a test text document with •United States Naval Academy• writt en inside. Prior to any connection, we turned off all of the IPSec policies on White-Queen and Red-King and initiated Wireshark on the two host machines of White-Queen and Red-King. After connecting, we then transferred the file. The Wireshark output proved that the entire transaction had, as we intended, been entirely clear-text.
We then configured the IPSec policy for the two computers to require Authentication only and no encryption. After conducting the same file transfer experiment again, we noted the implementation of the ISAKMP protocol and the 6 messages of Main Mode followed by the 3 messages of Quick mode. The first packet gave the following information regarding the Initiator Cookie, the exchange type, and the next payload to expect: The Responder also replied with the first payload as both computers had been configured for the same hierarchy of SA transforms. As the transform finished, the next packet included the nonce exchange from the Initiator as follows: As each computer had transmitted their nonces, they then entered into the information protection mode where the rest of the transmission was encrypted using the 768-bit MODP group Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Of note, here, is that the vulnerability of a Manin-the-Middle attack is negated by the use of nonces uniquely generated by each computer by using a private, unique integer.
After the rest of ISAKMP and IKE had finished determining the SAs for the rest of the communication, Authentication Headers were inserted after the IP header as the following example shows:
The AH SPI stays the same to identify the Security Payload being utilized by the two computers. The AH Sequence iterates for every pair of packets (i.e. each packet and its reply). The ICV gives the HMAC-MD5 hash utilized by the computers to provide authenticity for the packets.
We then tested the ESP of IPSec with the same transfer of the file via ftp. All of the steps to include the exchanging of nonces were the same. The difference came in that rather than the Authentication header appearing, the entire packet was encrypted, minus the IP header. The following gives an example:
The SPI and Sequence for the ESP work the same as for the Authentication Header. What follows, though, is the encryption of the payload using the DES-CBC algorithm.
IPSec With IPv6 and Linux
Our next attempt was at trying to institute IPSec with IPv6 between the computers. As has been consistent with Windows XP in regards to IPv6 implementation of networking protocols, the user has to utilize the program •IPsec6.exe• from the command line. This gives a broken table layout listing all of the SAs employed by the user on that system. Though allowing for the employment of IPv6 SAs via the uploading of an SA file via IPsec6.exe, there is limited support online for formatting and even fewer examples. Thus secpol.exe only applies to the implementation of IPSec on IPv4. In addition, though we were unable to test, it is documented that encryption in the ESP packet is not supported for the current implementation of IPv6 IPSec for Windows XP (see http://www.microsoft.com/technet/network/ipv6/ipv6faq.mspx).
We then attempted to implement IPSec on SUSE Linux. The two main programs utilized for this operation are OpenSwan (now known as StrongSwan) and kvpnc. However, the only capability of kvpnc interfacing with OpenSwan was for the connection and establishment of VPN tunnels with other networks. Due to time constraints, we did not modify OpenSwan or attempt any further application of IPSec with Linux.
Results
In this research study, we built both a fully functioning IPv4 network and a fully functioning IPv6 network. On the IPv4 network, we then tested and analyzed the packets transferred during the IPSec implementation. We were able to test the ramifications of different settings allowed by Windows XP for the implementation of IPSec to include the use of Authentication Headers and Encapsulating Payloads. We were also able to perform basic network tasks (ping and ftp) across a network using both the AHs and ESPs of IPSec.
After testing the basic network tasks and collecting the packets of the transaction via Wireshark, we were able to verify the process that IPSec implements, the uniqueness of the nonces transferred, the iteration of the Sequence Number, the SPI used to denote the SA established, and either the ICV or encrypted data that was sent. However, we noticed that neither Windows XP nor current Linux flavors offer Encapsulating Security Payloads for IPv6, and that the implementation of AHs with either OS is difficult and requires manual system administration. In addition, external to internal 1:1 Network Address Translation breaks the Authentication Header.
Recommendations
Further research in the implementation of IPSec is needed for more current Microsoft Operating Systems to include Windows Vista. Many of the issues that are faced by Windows XP may be due to the age of the OS and its quick retirement to a •legacy system•. As many of the more current operating systems provide better support for IPv6 in general, IPSec might also be better supported. In addition, further research is necessary for the utilization of third-party implementations of IPSec, especially OpenSwan.
Another area that was not tested was the employment of Virtual Private Networks utilizing IPSec. This can afford the ability to test and study the implications of network addressing schemes, especially ones that differ between networks connected via VPNs. In order to effectively test this employment of IPv6, the use of the IPv6/IPv4 tunnel that is already established with the United States Military Academy provides an excellent opportunity. However, our limitation in testing the employment of VPNs was primarily due to the limit of available routers that could support the construction of a VPN.
Conclusion
The goals we established from the onset of the research study were threefold: 1) to test and analyze the implementation of IPSec over an IPv4 network, 2) test and analyze the implementation of IPSec over an IPv6 network, and 3) test and analyze the implementation of IPSec over an IPv4/IPv6 network. These were to be tested using common, current operating systems to include Windows XP SP2 and SUSE 10.3 Linux.
The first goal was achieved as we were able to fully implement, test, and analyze the IPSec protocol over an IPv4 network. Microsoft Windows XP SP2 provides a relatively easy console for the administration of IPSec SAs and Policies for the computer and provides a flexibility to allow for interoperability between many other setups. We were not able to test on the Linux machine due to the nature of the implementation of IPSec, namely that of VPNs solely. From the testing of the IPSec packets, we were able to identify and track both the ISAKMP and IKE protocols and the construction of the SAs between two different computers. We also successfully transferred a file using the File Transport Protocol (FTP) successfully employing both AHs and ESPs.
The second goal was not fully achieved as we were unable to implement a fully working test case of IPSec over IPv6. However, due both to documentation as well as our testing, Windows XP can be said to not fully support the IPSec protocol in regards to IPSec.
Though not modified prior to compilation, the OpenSwan third-party implementation of IPSec for SUSE also did not provide IPv6 support. As Linux does not have other native employments of IPSec, it can be assumed that current versions of Linux, though natively supporting IPv6, per se, do not fully support IPSec for IPv6. Although we were unable to test the use of IPSec over a network that employs both IPv4 and IPv6, it can be assumed that the difference in headers between the two protocols breaks the ability for IPSec to work, especially as it is employed on the Network Layer. Further thoughts on the general security implications of IPSec are offered in Appendix C.
Therefore, IPSec affords networks many added security features. Rather than having to rely upon system administration for the security of individual applications, all protocols can be safely encrypted on an end-to-end basis. However, IPSec does not work with Network Address Translation. This is particularly disconcerting as the current use of the IPv4 protocol depends entirely upon the employment of NAT for the salvation of its limited address space. Thus it appears that IPSec is better suited for IPv6. However, to date, there is limited support for the implementation of IPSec in IPv6 by current vendors.
Appendix A: Diffie-Hellman and Key Creation
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, invented in 1976, was the first public-key algorithm to be developed. The beauty of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is its openness and resultant simplicity. The strength of the algorithm is derived from the difficulty in calculating discrete logarithms in finite fields. Of note, however, is the fact that that the Diffie-Hellman algorithm cannot be used for encryption or decryption, but rather for key exchange and distribution. A similar algorithm, the ElGamal scheme can be used for both digital signatures and encryption.
The following presents an example of a Diffie-Hellman exchange:
g n x <---------------------------------------> y The above gives a basic communication between two parties, in this case x and y, and how the Diffie-Hellman is derived for their communication. At the start of the communication, x and y both agree on n, a large prime number, and g, such that it is a primitive mod n, where mod( , ) ( ) a a n a n floor n    . These two numbers can be passed in the open over an insecure system. After the exchange of g and n, x chooses a random large integer, x k , and y chooses a random large integer, y k . These are kept secret by the parties and are not transmitted as is to other parties. When a random large integer has been chosen, x then calculates and transmits mod The use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is utilized by Internet Key Exchange Protocol for the development of a common key between two parties for the construction of both Authentication Headers and Encapsulating Security Payload. The Diffie-Hellman group is determined by the ISAKMP SAs that are established between the two parties and offer, besides different bit and field sizes, the use of either modulus prime or an elliptical curve analog.
One weakness of the use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, however, is the vulnerability to Man-in-the-Middle-Attacks. If a person, say z, can place themselves between x and y and perform the Diffie-Hellman on both sides of the communication, then x and y will not be able to detect an eavesdropper in the communication. This demonstrates the reason for ISAKMP•s use of cookies, specifically the Photuris key exchange, and SPIs to identify and designate the communication and actual individuals involved.
